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Abstract
When consumers concentrate their purchases at a single firm, a firm that offers
more products than its rivals can gain market share for all its other products, as well.
These spillovers induce firms to compete by offering a greater variety of products rather
than lower prices, and a natural form of industry concentration with few large firms
offering many products can arise if spillovers are strong enough.
This paper presents a simple model that illustrates this mechanism explicitly. The
empirical analysis documents strong demand spillovers in the retail segment of the
U.S. mutual fund industry, in which fees are non-trivial, families offer a large number
of funds, and the market is quite concentrated. Instead, spillovers are weaker, fees are
lower, families offer fewer funds, and the market structure is more fragmented in the
institutional segment. The current design of employer-sponsored defined-contribution
retirement plans likely accounts for these differential demand patterns between the
retail and the institutional segments.
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1 Introduction
In many industries, buyers concentrate their purchases at a single supplier, because of trans-
action or switching costs. For example, many consumers shop at a single supermarket;
several airlines acquire aircraft from a single manufacturer; most individuals hold checking
and savings accounts with the same bank. Thus, in such industries, firms’ product lines are
important strategic tools that vertically differentiate competing firms. The goal of this paper
is to investigate how these features—consumers deal with a single firm, and the number of
products is a measure of vertical differentiation between firms—determine market conduct
and market structure, with a special focus on the mutual fund industry.
With this goal in mind, the paper sets up a model that builds on Sutton’s (1991) seminal
endogenous sunk costs theory. On the supply side, the key idea is that offering a large
number of products affects fixed rather than variable costs. On the demand side, consumers
prefer firms that offer a greater variety of products. In this setting, a firm that offers more
products than its rivals gains market share for its other products, as well (Klemperer and
Padilla, 1997). These spillovers induce firms to compete by offering more and more products,
in an escalation mechanism akin to the form of competition observed in markets characterized
by network effects (Katz and Shapiro, 1985). The intensity of consumers’ preferences for a
firm’s variety of products critically determines the importance of spillovers and, thus, firms’
conduct and market structure. If consumers’ preferences for a firm’s variety of products
are strong, then a family gains a proportionally larger market share when offering more
products than its rivals—i.e., demand spillovers are strong. Hence, in equilibrium, firms
offer a large number of products at relatively high prices. This mode of competition implies
that incumbent firms incur high fixed costs, and new entrants must pay substantial setup
costs to be able to compete with incumbents. Hence, the industry sustains only a few large
firms and a natural form of market concentration arises. Instead, if consumers’ preferences for
a firm’s variety of products are weak, then a firm gains a small market share when offering
more products than its rivals—i.e., demand spillovers are weak. Thus, each firm offers a
more-limited number of products, prices are lower, and the industry is more fragmented.
The mutual fund industry provides an ideal candidate for investigating the role of firms’
variety of products and demand spillovers. First, industry data suggest that they play a role.
Figure 1 documents some aggregate trends over the period 1992 to 2007 for the retail (i.e.,
non-institutional) segment of the industry. The growth of the industry in the last couple
of decades has been explosive: The total number of retail funds available to investors grew
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Fig. 1: Trends in the Mutual Fund Industry, Retail Funds
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from a little over 2,000 funds in 1992 to slightly under 14,000 in 2007, a six-fold growth in
a 15-year period (top-left panel). Concurrently, the total assets managed by retail funds
grew from approximately 1.5 trillion dollars in 1992 to approximately 7.5 trillion dollars
in 2007. Obviously, the industry’s total growth attracted entry by some new families of
funds. (A family of mutual funds is a group of funds marketed under a single brand name.
Usually, the family is the distributor of its funds—i.e., sells and redeems shares of its funds
in transactions with investors—and an investment advisor, as well. Examples of families
are Vanguard, American Funds, and Fidelity. Examples of mutual funds are Vanguard
Equity Income Fund, American Balanced Fund, and Fidelity Dividend Growth Fund.) On
aggregate, the number of families increased by approximately 50 percent from 1992 to 2007
(top-right panel), but the increase weakened throughout the period, in particular after 1999.
Instead, the six-fold growth of the total number of funds was fueled by a four-fold increase in
the average number of funds per family (bottom-left panel). Moreover, the largest families
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grew disproportionately more than other families. As a result, the total market share of the
largest four families almost doubled over the period 1992-2007 (bottom-right panel).
Second, the mutual fund industry fits the key demand and supply assumptions of our
model well: 1) Most investors confine their mutual fund holdings to a single fund family,
for two main reasons. First, employer-sponsored retirement plans frequently offer funds
belonging to a single family. For example, Huberman and Jiang (2006), Elton, Gruber and
Blake (2006) and Cohen and Schmidt (2009) study samples of 401(k) plans and document
that most of them offer funds of a single family. Second, “shopping” costs (i.e., transaction,
search and switching costs) induce investors to hold funds of a single family.1 Some of
these costs are monetary—a family often charges load fees when investors move assets out
of the family, but not when they move assets within the family. Other costs could be
psychological—the process of searching among a large number of funds across many families
may be daunting.2 As a result, Stark and Yates (2008) find that investors tend to buy
funds from a single family even when they are investing through a discount brokerage firm.
2) The number of funds that a family offers plays a key role in determining choice among
families. For example, when offering a retirement plan to a large number of employees with
heterogeneous preferences over their portfolio choices, a family with a larger number of funds
will better suit these employees. Similarly, shopping costs imply that moving money across
funds of the same family is cheaper than moving money across families (Massa, 2003). The
higher the number of funds in a family, the lower are investors’ costs since more funds provide
greater liquidity services. In summary, the number of funds is a key characteristic that
vertically differentiates families. 3) The costs structure of the industry is well described by
large fixed costs and low variable costs. Indeed, the main expenses to operate a fund—such as
the compensation of the fund manager and administrative costs—do not grow proportionally
with total net assets.
Third, the mutual fund industry is composed of two distinct segments—retail and institutional—
that cater to different types of investors. In particular, institutional investors are usually
larger and more sophisticated than retail investors (Section 3 provides more detail on the
differences between segments). Hence, the difference between the benefits of finding a higher-
performance or a lower-priced fund and the costs of switching across families is larger for
institutional investors than for retail investors. Therefore, firms’ variety of products and,
1Several authors document the importance of such costs in the mutual fund industry (e.g., Sirri and
Tufano, 1998; Massa, 2003; and Hortac¸su and Syverson, 2004). As the existence of these costs has already
been established, this paper does not offer direct evidence on them. Rather, the paper derives implications
of these costs for competition in the industry.
2Klemperer (1995) offers a rich illustration of these shopping costs.
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thus, spillovers arguably play a different role in the two segments.
The empirical analysis of the paper starts by showing aggregate mutual fund data that
reveal striking differences between the retail and institutional segments of the market. Specif-
ically, in the retail segment, families offer more funds; funds have higher fees; the market is
more concentrated; and the total number of funds is larger than in the institutional segment.
These patterns are exactly the outcomes predicted by the theoretical model if preferences for
firms’ variety of products and spillovers are stronger in the retail segment than in the institu-
tional segment. Thus, the empirical analysis seeks to measure and compare spillovers in the
two segments of the market. In particular, using CRSP data for the period 1999-2006, we
examine whether families that offer a larger number of funds or a larger number of categories
of funds gain a more-than-proportional market share. The main challenge to this analysis
is to properly distinguish demand for firms’ product portfolios from other factors—such as
supply-side economies of scale—that may generate a similar relationship between number of
funds/categories and market share. Hence, as in a standard demand and supply estimation,
in order to identify demand for firms’ product varieties, we employ variables that shift the
number of funds offered by a family for supply reasons. More precisely, an influential liter-
ature has empirically documented the spatial agglomeration of firms belonging to the same
industry (for a summary, see Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999), and a few papers have
shown that firms located in these areas where an industry concentrates are, on average, larger
than firms in the same industry outside such areas (for evidence across industries, see Holmes
and Stevens, 2002; for evidence on the mutual fund industry, see Table 1 in Christoffersen
and Sarkissian, 2009). Thus, everything else equal, the supply of funds/categories should be
higher if a family is located where employment in the financial sector is higher. Hence, we
retrieve from CRSP the zip code of the headquarters of each family, and we match it to the
total employment in the financial sector (and to the total number of establishments) of the
corresponding county, retrieved from the County Business Patterns, a U.S. Census database,
to obtain a measure of the density of the financial sector relative to other industries.
We find clear evidence that demand for firms’ variety of products and spillovers are
stronger in the retail segment than in the institutional segment of the market. More precisely,
a family that offers ten percent more funds (categories) than its rivals has a 4.8 (10.1) percent
higher average per-fund market share in the retail segment, but does not gain a higher average
per-fund market share in the institutional segment. We also perform our analysis at the fund
and at the category level, and we find even stronger results. We further check the robustness
of our results to potential concerns about the validity of the instruments using an alternative
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set of instrumental variables, and we find identical results.
The paper makes a number of contributions. First, the mechanisms identified in this
paper are not unique to the mutual fund industry, but also help explain the role of firms’
product portfolios and spillovers in a wide range of markets. In many industries, the largest
firms are frequently the most successful in launching new products or entering new markets,
and this paper is among the first to investigate market outcomes when consumers value
firms’ product-line breadth. More generally, the paper illustrates how markets operate when
vertical differentiation between firms is important. Second, this paper is one of the first to
investigate market conduct and market structure in the mutual fund industry, an important
industry that manages a large fraction of retirement savings in the U.S. While there have
been other important trends in the mutual fund industry in recent years—such as the growth
of index funds and ETFs—the paper connects the industrial organization of the U.S. mutual
fund industry with its largest component of demand—i.e., retirement accounts (Cohen and
Schmidt, 2009). In doing so, the paper provides a coherent explanation for why, given the
industry’s total growth, the entry of new families has been limited, and the introduction
of new funds by incumbent families has been more substantial. The model also provides a
simple economic rationale for the limited price competition observed in the industry and for
the existence of a large number of funds, both of which have been viewed as “puzzles” in
the mutual fund literature (Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu´, 2009; Massa, 1997). The economic
mechanism proposed also matches well with key features of the industry and comments
from market participants. For example, The No-Load Fund Investor,3 a popular investment
newsletter, writes: “The tremendous increase in the number of funds has been propelled by
investor demand and by the need for fund groups to each offer a complete array of funds.”
2 Related Literature
This paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, an influential literature
studies the determinants of market structure. Most theoretical explanations focus on supply-
side reasons. Sutton’s seminal work highlights how endogenous sunk costs—such as advertis-
ing and R&D—affect market structure and concentration (Sutton, 1991 and 1998). Ellickson
(2006) provides an interesting empirical application of Sutton’s theory to the supermarket
industry, in which competition in large markets induces supermarkets to expand the array
of products offered to consumers, thereby reducing the entry of new firms. Berry and Wald-
3http://www.noloadfundinvestor.com/.
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fogel (2010) investigate the relationship among market size, product quality, and market
concentration in two contrasting industries—daily newspapers and restaurants—that differ
in whether quality is produced mainly with fixed or variable costs, respectively. The present
paper displays some key differences from these empirical papers: While they exploit variation
in market size to understand the nature of supply (i.e., sunk costs), we focus on two segments
of the same industry that differ in their demands—more precisely, in their valuations of the
endogenous characteristic supplied through fixed costs.
Some papers use demand-side arguments to explain patterns of market concentration
and market power. The most closely related papers are those that investigate the effects of
switching costs on firms’ incentives to offer multiple products (Klemperer, 1995; Klemperer
and Padilla, 1997). Starting with Borenstein (1989 and 1991), several empirical papers inves-
tigate the “hub-premium” in airline markets—whereby an airline with a dominant presence
at an airport obtains a higher market share and charges higher prices on all trips originating
from the dominant airport—and the role of switching costs, such as frequent flyer programs,
in generating this premium (Lederman, 2008). Also related is the literature on network
externalities and, in particular, the papers that investigate the effects of product compati-
bility on market outcomes (Katz and Shapiro, 1985 and 1994; Matutes and Regibeau, 1988;
Economides, 1989)—more precisely, the empirical papers that consider the effects of ATM
surcharge fees on banks’ optimal ATMs network size and deposit account pricing (Knittel
and Stango, 2008 and 2009; Gowrisankaran and Krainer, 2011). One contribution of the
present paper is to empirically document that the mutual fund industry shares some key
features with network industries.
This paper contributes to a second strand of literature on multiproduct firms and product-
line breadth. The theoretical literature suggests that firms offer multiple products to prevent
the entry of rival firms (Schmalensee, 1978; Shaked and Sutton, 1990) and to increase their
market share and profitability (Lancaster, 1979). A few papers empirically investigate the
impact of a product-line extension, finding that firms are able to increase prices and sales
once they extend their product line (Kadiyali, Vilcassim and Chintagunta, 1999; Draganska
and Jain, 2005). Unlike these papers, we illustrate how an industry’s institutional arrange-
ments can generate demand for firms’ varieties, as well as their implications for competition,
industry equilibrium, market structure and concentration.
Finally, the paper is related to the literature on mutual funds. Most papers analyze
mutual funds’ returns and/or portfolios, and only recently have a few papers focused on
the role of families and on the industrial organization of the industry. Khorana and Servaes
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(1999) empirically examine the determinants of mutual fund starts and find that economies of
scale and scope, the family’s prior performance, and the overall level of funds invested are the
main factors that induce families to set up new funds. Khorana and Servaes (2007) investigate
the determinants of market shares and document that families that charge lower fees, perform
better, and start more funds relative to the competition have a higher market share. Massa
(1998 and 2003) argues that families use market segmentation and fund proliferation to
exploit investors’ heterogeneity, to limit competition, and to increase market coverage. Wahal
and Wang (2011) examine the impact of the entry of new funds on incumbents, and show
that competition lowers management fees and investor flows. Nanda, Wang and Zheng
(2004) and Ivkovic´ (2004) investigate the importance of spillovers arising from the stellar
performance of other funds in the same family. Hortac¸su and Syverson (2004) examine how
search costs affect the proliferation of mutual funds and the dispersion of their fees. Pollet
and Wilson (2008) investigate how funds and families respond to asset growth, finding that
family growth is correlated with the introduction of new funds and that families with more
funds diversify less rapidly as they grow. Park (2008) examines how advertising affects the
market structure of the mutual fund industry. Some of these papers mention demand-side
spillovers (in particular, Massa, 2003), but none of them considers the supply side of the
market, thereby characterizing industry equilibrium, market structure and concentration.
3 Background: Retail and Institutional Funds
The purpose of this section is to shed light on the key differences between the retail and
institutional segments of the mutual fund industry. For a more thorough description of the
industry, see Gremillion (2005).
Retail mutual funds are aimed toward individual investors—i.e., households—and tax-
advantaged individual retirement accounts have been instrumental in the growth of the retail
segment in the last decades.4 According to the Investment Company Institute (ICI, 2008),
many of today’s mutual fund owners were introduced to mutual fund investing through
retirement plans. For example, 59 percent of mutual fund-owning households indicated
that they purchased their first fund through an employer-sponsored retirement plan, and
that fraction increases to 68 percent for households that purchased mutual funds after 2000.
Thus, retirement plans are, today, the most common source through which individuals invest
4Sialm and Starks (2009) investigate whether the characteristics, investment strategies, and performance
of mutual funds held by taxable investors differ from those of funds held primarily in tax-deferred retirement
accounts.
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in mutual funds: Fifty-one percent of households that owned mutual funds viewed retirement
plans as their main fund-purchase source (ICI, 2008). As a result, Cohen and Schmidt (2009)
report that in 2004, more than 60 percent of new flows into non-money market mutual funds
were due to retirement accounts.
Two main types of individual retirement plans exist: 1) employer-sponsored defined-
contribution plans, such as 401(k) plans, and 2) IRA/Keogh plans. Both types have an
almost 50-percent share of total retirement assets, but they differ in several aspects.5 An
employer-sponsored plan is a benefit an employer provides to its employees. Thus, the em-
ployer initiates the plan, chooses the plan rules (eligibility, vesting, etc.), and arranges for its
administration, commonly outsourcing it to an external organization, such as a mutual fund
company, an insurance company, or an HR-benefit firm. The administrator is in charge of
setting up an individual account for each plan participant, recording the participant’s invest-
ment choices, buying and selling shares in particular mutual funds, etc. While the function
of administrator and of investment provider are sometimes separate, the same company more
frequently provides both. Gremillion (2005) explains: “Administering a defined contribution
plan, particularly performing participant record keeping, costs a great deal, often more than
can be recovered in administration fees. Mutual fund companies that perform defined contri-
bution record keeping—Fidelity, Vanguard, Putnam, etc.—do so primarily to gather assets
into the funds, not to make money on record keeping.” Indeed, Cohen and Schmidt (2009)
find that inclusion in a 401(k) plan has a large positive effect on a family’s inflows. The
employer and the administrator negotiate over the investments available to the employees,
thus restricting employees’ choice set. For example, until recently, Vanguard allowed plans
for which it performed record keeping to choose Vanguard mutual funds only. Indeed, Hu-
berman and Jiang (2006), Elton, Gruber and Blake (2006) and Cohen and Schmidt (2009),
using different samples, document that most 401(k) plans offer funds of a single family only.
Hence, a fund family with a larger number of funds is appealing to employers with a large
number of employees, who may have heterogeneous preferences over their portfolio choices
(because of age, income, or idiosyncratic taste). For instance, Agnew, Balduzzi and Sunde´n
(2003) study allocations in retirement accounts and find that equity allocations are higher
for males, married investors, younger investors, investors with higher earnings, and those
with more seniority on the job.6
5Total individual-account retirement assets amounted to $6.767 trillion in 2004, according to the Employee
Benefit Research Institute (2008). These assets were almost equally split between the two main forms of
retirement plans: $3.384 trillion in employer-sponsored defined-contribution plans, such as 401(k) plans, and
$3.383 trillion in IRA/Keogh accounts.
6Huberman and Jiang (2006) report these additional facts about investors’ choice among retirement funds:
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An IRA plan, however, is not linked to employment, and any individual can open such a
plan at a mutual fund company or a brokerage firm. Nonetheless, if the individual chooses to
open an IRA with a mutual fund company, investment choices are still restricted exclusively
to a family’s funds. Similarly, if the individual chooses to open an IRA with a brokerage
firm, families’ offerings still affect investment choices through load fees.
Institutional investors—nonfinancial businesses, financial institutions, nonprofit organi-
zations, state and local governments, and funds holding mutual fund shares—mainly pur-
chase fund shares directly from fund companies that often create special share classes or
funds expressly for them. Nonfinancial businesses and financial institutions use mutual
funds primarily as a tool to manage their cash, thus investing the majority of their assets
in money market funds. Instead, the investments of nonprofit organizations, state and local
governments, and funds holding mutual fund shares are more evenly split across the main
categories of funds (equities, fixed-income, hybrid and money market funds). Institutional
investors are larger and, on average, more sophisticated than individual investors (Hortac¸su
and Syverson, 2004). Moreover, their investment choices are not restricted to a single fam-
ily, and their costs of switching across families are small relative to the gains of finding a
higher-performance or a lower-priced fund.
Overall, these considerations suggest that the number of funds that a family offers plays
a different role in determining market shares in the retail and in the institutional segments.
Thus, we expect that demand spillovers differs across the two segments. The next Section
presents a simple model that investigates how these demand spillovers affect market structure
and market conduct. The model will guide the empirical analysis of Section 5.
4 A Simple Model
In this section, we introduce a simple model that adapts the theoretical framework of Sutton
(1991) to the mutual fund industry. The main goal of the model is to investigate in the
simplest way how the demand for a firm’s product portfolio shapes competitive outcomes
in the industry. More precisely, we make the simplest assumptions on the demand-side of
“First, participants choose to invest their savings in a small number of funds—typically no more than three or
four—regardless of the number of funds their plans offer. Second, a substantial fraction of participants tend
to allocate their contributions evenly among the funds they choose. Third, there is little relation between the
proportion of contributions that participants allocate to equity funds (equity allocation) and the proportion
of equity funds that their plans offer (equity exposure).” See, also, Choi, Laibson and Madrian (2004) for
the impact of 401(k) plan design on saving outcomes.
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the model (assuming, in particular, that the decision-maker chooses funds of a single family,
rather than deriving it from first principles—i.e., shopping costs), and focus on two key
families’ supply choices: the number of funds offered and the fees. In turn, these choices
determine the equilibrium number of families and, thus, market concentration. The main
advantage of this setup is that it delivers testable implications that have intuitive empirical
counterparts.
Demand—Consider a decision maker selecting a mutual-fund family—for example, an
employer with a large number of employees with heterogeneous preferences over portfolio
choices. The decision maker chooses among families of funds that are vertically differentiated,
differing by the number of funds offered Nj and the price pj. The decision maker’s indirect
utility from choosing family j is equal to:
uj = αN logNj − αppj + j .
The parameter αN measures the importance of demand spillovers: A higher αN makes the
number of funds NJ that a family offers more important for the decision maker. j is a
preference shock, assumed to be i.i.d. across consumers and families, distributed according
to the type I extreme value distribution (McFadden, 1974). Thus, the market share of family
j is equal to:
s (Nj, pj) =
exp (αN logNj − αppj)∑
j exp (αN logNj − αppj)
. (1)
Supply—The industry is populated by a large number of homogeneous potential en-
trants (families) that compete by offering funds and by charging fees. A family j offering Nj
funds has a cost function equal to
C (Nj) = K + FNj, (2)
where K > 0 is a set-up cost and F > 0 is a fixed cost per fund. Thus, the cost function
C (Nj) assumes that fixed costs are strictly positive (so there are always economies of scale)
and that the introduction of each fund affects families’ fixed costs exclusively.
Using the market share (1) and the cost function (2), we obtain family profits as
pi (Nj , pj) = pjs (Nj, pj)M − C (Nj) ,
where M is the exogenous size of the market. Each family j chooses the number N∗j of funds
and the price p∗j that maximize its profits pi (Nj, pj) . The first-order conditions for optimality
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are:
pj : Msj − p
∗
jMαpsj (1− sj) = 0
Nj :
p∗jMαNsj (1− sj)
N∗j
− F = 0,
where sj = s
(
N∗j , p
∗
j
)
.
Free entry determines the number S∗ of active families in equilibrium. Thus, ignoring
integer constraints, free entry drives down profits to zero—i.e., pi
(
N∗j , p
∗
j
)
= 0.
Proposition 1 In a symmetric equilibrium, in a large market M :
(i) If αN > 1, the number N
∗ of funds offered by each family is equal to (αN−1)M
αpF
, the price
p∗ is equal to αN
αp
, and the number S∗ of families is equal to αN
αN−1
.
(ii) If αN ≤ 1, the number N
∗ of funds offered by each family is equal to αNK
(1−αN )F
, the price
p∗ is equal to 1
αp
, and the number S∗ of families is equal to (1−αN )M
αpK
.
Proof. In a symmetric equilibrium, p∗j = p
∗ and N∗j = N
∗. Thus, s∗j = 1/S
∗, and we can
rewrite the first-order conditions as:
p∗αp
(
1−
1
S∗
)
= 1, (3)
p∗MαN
(
1−
1
S∗
)
= FN∗S∗, (4)
and the free-entry condition as:
pi (N∗, p∗) =
p∗M
S∗
−K − FN∗ = 0. (5)
We can substitute equations (3) and (4) into the zero-profit condition (5), rearrange and
obtain:
M =
αpKS
∗ (S∗ − 1)
αN + S∗ (1− αN )
. (6)
(i) Consider a large market—i.e., M → +∞—and suppose S∗ → +∞. Then, the left-
hand side of equation (6) diverges to positive infinity, while the right-hand side of equation
(6) diverges to negative infinity since its sign is equal to αpK(S−1)
1−αN
< 0. However, this is
impossible. Thus, the only possibility is αN + S
∗ (1− αN) = 0, which we can solve for S
∗ as
S∗ =
αN
αN − 1
.
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Substituting S∗ = αN
αN−1
into equations (3) and (4), we obtain that the price p∗ is equal
to αN
αp
and the number N∗ of funds is equal to (αN−1)M
αpF
.
(ii) In a large market—i.e., M → +∞—the left-hand side of equation (6) diverges to
positive infinity and the right-hand side has a positive sign. Thus, S∗ has to diverge to
positive infinity, as well. Moreover, letting M → +∞ and S∗ → +∞ into equations (3)
and (4), we obtain that the price p∗ is equal to 1
αp
and the number N∗ of funds is equal to
αNK
(1−αN )F
. Substituting p∗ = 1
αp
and N∗ = αNK
(1−αN )F
into equation (4), and noting that 1
S∗
= 0,
we obtain
S∗ =
(1− αN)M
αpK
.
Proposition 1 highlights the stark effects of demand-side spillovers on firms’ equilibrium
strategies. In particular, two distinct types of equilibria arise, depending on whether the
parameter αN is larger or smaller than one—i.e., the rate at which fixed costs increase as
families add new funds. If demand spillovers are strong (αN > 1), competition induces
families to offer a large number of funds rather than low fees. As a result, the industry is
concentrated even in large markets. However, if demand spillovers are weak (αN ≤ 1), the
number of funds that each family offers is limited, fees are lower, and the industry is more
fragmented in larger markets. In particular, the number S∗ of families converges to a finite
constant when spillovers are strong; instead S∗ grows at the same rate as market size M
when spillovers are weak, implying that the number of families is larger if spillovers are weak.
Figure 2 further displays equilibrium outcomes in markets of moderate sizes, confirming the
comparisons of Proposition 1.
The intuition for the results of Proposition 1 closely follows the arguments of Shaked
and Sutton (1987). When decision makers place a high value on the number of funds—i.e.,
the dimension of vertical differentiation between families—a family that offers more funds
than its competitors can undercut their fees and gain a proportionally larger market share
since offering more funds affects fixed rather than marginal costs. Thus, only a few large
families can survive in equilibrium, and the industry stays concentrated even in a large
market. When, instead, decision makers place a relatively low value on the number of funds
(αN ≤ 1), increasing its funds offerings and undercutting rivals’ fees is not profitable, in
particular when firms are already choosing low fees that almost equal marginal cost—i.e.,
zero. Moreover, in a large market, even very low fees generate enough variable profits to
cover fixed costs. Thus, many families survive in equilibrium, and the industry is fragmented.
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Fig. 2: Comparative Statics
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Proposition 1 suggests that strong spillovers provide a potential explanation for the lim-
ited price competition observed in the mutual fund industry (Sirri and Tufano, 1993; Khorana
and Servaes, 2007; Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu´, 2009). Moreover, the strength of spillovers also
affects the aggregate number of funds offered to investors, providing a theoretical explana-
tion for the existence of a large number of funds, which has been viewed as a puzzle (Massa,
1997).
Corollary 2 The total number of funds N∗S∗ is higher and the market share M
N∗S∗
of each
fund is lower if spillovers are higher (higher αN ).
Proof. Using the expressions for N∗ and S∗ derived in the proof of Proposition 1, we obtain
that N∗S∗ = αNM
αpF
. Thus, N∗S∗ is increasing and M
N∗S∗
is decreasing in αN , the extent of
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demand-side spillovers.
In summary, although the life cycle of the mutual fund industry, like that of any other
industry, is clearly more complex than our simple theoretical framework, the model can
explain salient features of competition among fund families. Furthermore, the analysis of
Shaked and Sutton (1987) and Sutton (1991) indicates that the substance of the results does
not depend on some of the simplifying assumptions imposed. In particular, the results are
robust to several important extensions: 1) heterogeneous preference αN across consumers;
2) additional horizontal or vertical characteristics that affect investors’ utility function; 3)
heterogeneous fixed costs F across firms; and 4) sequential entry of firms.
5 Empirical Analysis
This section first describes the data employed in this study. It then illustrates some striking
differences between the institutional and retail segments of the mutual fund industry. In
particular, in the retail segment, families offer more funds, funds have higher fees, the market
is more concentrated, and the total number of funds is larger than in the institutional
segment. These patterns are exactly what Proposition 1 and Corollary 2 imply if spillovers
are stronger in the retail segment than in the institutional segment. Thus, the following
subsections measure and compare demand spillovers in the two segments.
5.1 Data
The empirical analysis is based on the mutual fund database compiled by the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP). This dataset provides mutual-fund data for all funds,
including defunct funds. We include in the sample all active funds for which the main fund
characteristics—total net assets, returns, turnover ratio, expense ratio, load, etc.—and their
family identifier are available.
CRSP also reports the zip code of the headquarters of each fund family. We use this
information to complement the CRSP Mutual Fund Database with data from the County
Business Patterns (CBP).7 Specifically, we match the zip code of the headquarters of each
family to the corresponding county in CBP. The CBP dataset is unique in its coverage of
all private sectors of the economy and its link to location. In particular, for each county
7The CBP is available at http://www.census.gov/econ/cbp/index.html.
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and four-digit industry pair, the CBP reports total number of plants, total employment, and
total payroll.
Since CRSP reports family headquarters’ zip codes starting from 1999, we restrict our re-
gression analysis to the period from 1999 to 2007, although we present some general industry
trends for the period 1992 to 2007.
5.1.1 Variables and Summary Statistics
We follow the CRSP Mutual Fund Database and previous literature for the construction
of most of variables. CRSP treats multiple share classes offered by a fund as separate
entities, and we define each single share class as a separate fund.8 (Since this definition may
be arbitrary, we also perform our analysis using an alternative classification that does not
depend on this definition; see below.) CRSP classifies each fund as retail or institutional, and
we follow this definition. We then treat retail and institutional funds as separate segments. In
particular, we include only funds within each segment when we calculate aggregate variables.
From CRSP, we obtain Fund Tna (fund’s total net assets), and we construct Fund
Market Sharejt, the market share of fund j in year t, as
100∗Fund Tnajt∑
j Fund Tnajt
where
∑
jFund
Tnajt is computed summing over retail or institutional funds only. CRSP reports each
fund’s monthly return rjikmt, and we construct a Fund Return as Rjikt =
12∏
m=1
(1 + rjikmt)
where j denotes a fund, i denotes a family, k denotes a category/investment objective (i.e.,
money market, U.S. equities, etc.), m denotes a month and t denotes a year. Fund Fees are
equal to regular expenses, plus one seventh of front- and rear-end fees charged by the family.
Hence, we are assuming a seven-year investment horizon, as in previous studies (Sirri and
Tufano, 1989; Khorana and Servaes, 2007). Fund Turnover follows the CRSP definition.
We construct most family-level variables by averaging the fund-level variables of all funds
within a family and within each segment (retail or institutional), weighting each fund by
its assets. Moreover, in order to partially take into account the heterogeneity in family
strategies across different categories of funds, we construct some family-level variables by
taking the weighted average of fund characteristics calculated as deviations from the average
8Fund sponsors frequently offer different share classes of a single portfolio to investors, primarily load or
no-load classes. The three share classes commonly offered by multiple-class funds are denoted A, B and C.
The A class is the traditional class in which investors pay a front-end load and an annual 12b-1 fee of 25
to 35 basis points to compensate brokers. In comparison, the B and C classes have no front-end loads but
may charge a contingent deferred sales load (CDSL) upon exit and usually charge higher annual 12b-1 fees
of about 1 percent. See Nanda, Wang, and Zheng (2009) for an analysis of funds’ decision to issue multiple
share classes.
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characteristics of all funds in the same category. For example, the aggregate performance of
family i in year t is measured as the Family Excess Return:
Family Excess Returnit =
∑
j
ωjikt
(
Rjikt −
∑
l
ωl·ktRl·kt
)
,
where, as before, j denotes a fund, i denotes a family, k denotes a category/investment
objective and t denotes a year. ωjikt is fund j’s share of family i’s total assets in year t;
Rjikt is the return of fund j of family i belonging to category k in year t; and ωl·kt is fund
l’s share of category k′s assets in year t. Thus,
∑
l ωl·ktRl·kt is the weighted average return of
all funds belonging to category k in year t, and Rjikt −
∑
l ωl·ktRl·kt is the year t-abnormal
return of fund j of family i belonging to category k. Thus, Family Excess Returnit
adjusts for all factors that may affect all funds in the same investment category (Khorana
and Servaes, 2007). Moreover, we also construct the variable Family Variance Excess
Return as
∑
j ωjikt (Rjikt −
∑
l ωl·ktRl·kt)
2 to control for the heterogeneity of fund returns
within a family. Similarly, we construct the variable Family Fees and Family Turnover
as
∑
j ωjiktxjikt, where xjikt is the fee or the turnover, respectively, of fund j of family i
belonging to category k in year t.
The main explanatory variables of interest measure the number of products offered by
a family in the corresponding segment (retail or institutional), and we measure it in two
complementary ways. The first one—Family Funds—is the total number of funds offered by
a family. Since we are treating each share class offered by a fund as a separate entity, Family
Funds may, perhaps, overestimate the number of funds available to investors. Thus, we also
construct a second measure that is not affected by this potential mismeasurement: Family
Categories, the total number of categories/investment objectives in which a family offers
at least one fund. Hence, Family Categories performs an important robustness check
(which we could have performed by defining a fund as the aggregation of all share classes
of a unique portfolio), and has the additional advantage of providing a measure of families’
offerings that emphasizes product-line breadth across different investment objectives. CRSP
offers several distinct classifications of funds’ categories/investment objectives. We employ
the most-detailed classification available, the Lipper objective codes classification. Thus, the
variable Family Categories is a count of the number of distinct Lipper objective codes
offered by a fund family.
Finally, we obtain from the CBP some variables that we use as instruments in our empiri-
cal analysis: Total Establishments and Employment Financial Sector are defined
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exactly as in CBP, where the financial sector refers to either SIC 60 or NAICS 52; Wage
is calculated as total payroll divided by total employment, and Wage Financial Sector
is total payroll in the financial sector divided by Employment Financial Sector. All
these variables refer to the county in which the zip code of the family’s address reported in
CRSP is located. Moreover, we also calculate the distance of the family headquarters from
New York City as di =
√
(lati − latNY )
2 + (longi − longNY )
2, where latj and longj are the
latitude and longitude of zip code j. Zip code 10012 is used for all families located in New
York City.
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the main variables used in the empirical analysis.
The first two columns of data refer to the retail segment of the market. There are 66,270
fund-year observations in this segment. On average, a retail fund has a market share of
approximately one percent, and there is considerable heterogeneity in the size of funds:
The standard deviation of the market share is equal to 5.5 percent. The (unweighted)
average fee in the retail sector equals 1.92 percent and the average return 7.6 percent. The
average retail fund belongs to a family with 120 funds spanning 27 different categories. The
heterogeneity across families is substantial: The standard deviations of Family Funds and
Family Categories are equal to 93 funds and 16 categories, and all other family variables
exhibit significant variations across families.
The last two columns present summary statistics for the institutional segment of the
market. As Section 3 argues, demand spillovers should not play the same role in the two
segments of the market. Indeed, Table 1 presents some suggestive patterns. The average
institutional fund has a larger market share, is cheaper and younger, yields a higher return,
and has a lower turnover than a retail fund. Interestingly, the average institutional fund
belongs to a smaller family than a retail fund does—a family with 60 funds spanning 18
different categories.
5.2 A Graphical Comparison
Figure 3 displays striking differences between the institutional and retail segments of the
market over the period 1992-2007. First, the top-left plot shows that families offer a larger
(asset-weighted) number of funds in the retail segment than in the institutional segment.
Second, the top-right plot shows that (asset-weighted) fees are higher in the retail segment.
Third, the bottom-left plot shows that the retail segment is less concentrated than the
institutional segment: The market share of the largest four families of institutional funds is
about only half of the market share of the largest four families of retail funds. Moreover,
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while the retail segment has become more concentrated over time, the institutional segment
has become less concentrated. Fourth, the bottom-right panel documents that the total
number of funds is larger in the retail than in the institutional segment.
These patterns match exactly the predictions of the simple model presented in Section 4
if spillovers are stronger in the retail segment than in the institutional segment. Thus, the
goal of the next subsections is to measure these spillovers by estimating a demand system in
each segment, enriching the demand system given by equation (1) of the theoretical model.9
5.3 Demand Spillovers in the Retail Segment
We proceed in three complementary ways to measure demand spillovers in the retail segment
of the industry. First, we investigate whether a family that offers more funds or categories
than its rivals has a proportionally larger market share (and assets under management).
Second, we investigate whether a fund whose family offers more funds or categories than its
rivals has a larger market share. Third, we investigate whether a family that offers more
funds or categories than its rivals has a larger market share in the categories that it offers.
5.3.1 Family-level Evidence
To investigate the importance of demand spillovers at the family level, we estimate a demand
system rearranging the market share equation (1) of the theoretical model (see Berry, 1994),
also including additional variables that control for factors that the model does not consider.
Specifically, we estimate the following regression equation:10
Log (Family Market Shareit) = αLog(Varietyit)+ γZit + ηt + it. (7)
The dependent variable Log(Family Market Shareit) is the log of a family’s aggregate
market share—i.e., the total net assets of family i in year t divided by the total net assets
of all families in year t. The key variable of interest is Varietyit, defined as either Family
Funds—i.e., the total number of funds offered by a family—or Family Categories—i.e.,
the total number of categories/investment objectives in which a family offers at least one
9An alternative empirical design may be to perform one family-level regression and one fund-level re-
gression, using dummy variables to distinguish the key coefficients of retail funds from institutional funds.
While this is certainly feasible, the main advantage of the empirical design followed below is that it does
not constrain the coefficients of the additional control variables to be the same in the retail and institutional
segments.
10More precisely, equation (7) obtains after taking logs in equation (1), recognizing that the log of the
denominator of the right-hand side is constant within a year. Thus, the year fixed effect in equation (7)
captures it.
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Fig. 3: A Graphical Comparison: Institutional Funds vs. Retail Funds
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fund—offered by family i in year t. Zit is a vector of variables specific to each individual
family, such as the average return of all funds, the variance of returns of all funds, and the
(log of the) age of the family, measured as the age of the oldest active fund. ηt is a year fixed
effect that capture aggregate trends in the industry (e.g., the growth of ETFs or the inflows
by new, and perhaps less sophisticated, households). it is an idiosyncratic unobserved com-
ponent. Since the regression equation (7) includes year dummies, the estimated coefficients
are identical if Log(Family Tnait) is the dependent variable.
The use of the variables Family Funds and Family Categories creates a potential
challenge to identifying the effects of the demand spillovers in equation (7). The reason is that
both measures of varieties/product-line breadth are chosen by each profit-maximizing family
and, thus, are endogenous. In particular, any observed correlation between our measures of
a family’s varieties and a family’s aggregate market share could be due to either demand
or supply reasons, or both. For example, if supply-side economies of scale—i.e., lower re-
search, product development, marketing, advertising, and various administrative costs—and
economies of scope—i.e., cost complementarities—are significant, larger fund families may
enjoy lower costs per fund and, thus, offer more funds (Khorana and Servaes, 1999).
Hence, the previous supply-side arguments could invalidate the tests of our predictions.
Thus, as in a standard demand and supply estimation, in order to identify demand-side
spillovers, we employ variables that shift Family Funds and Family Categories for
supply-side reasons. Specifically, an influential economic geography literature has empiri-
cally documented the spatial agglomeration of firms belonging to the same industry (for
a summary, see Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999), and a few papers have shown that
firms located in these areas where an industry concentrates are, on average, larger than
firms in the same industry outside such areas (for evidence across industries, see Holmes and
Stevens, 2002; for evidence on the mutual fund industry, see Table 1 in Christoffersen and
Sarkissian, 2009). The general reason is that firms located where an industry concentrates
enjoy larger labor pools and larger flows of ideas (Marshall, 1920), thereby growing in size.
Indeed, applying these insights to the mutual fund industry, Christoffersen and Sarkissian
(2009) emphasize the difficulty of hiring fund managers away from financial centers and the
positive information spillovers of these financial centers. Hence, everything else equal, the
supply of funds/categories should be higher if a family is located where employment in the
financial sector is higher. Thus, we retrieve from CRSP the zip code of the headquarters
of each family, and we match it to Employment Financial Sector (and to Total
Establishments) of the corresponding county to obtain a measure of the density of the
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financial sector, also relative to other industries. Moreover, we further employ as an instru-
ment Log(Distance from NYC), the distance of each family’s headquarters from New
York City. Table A1 in the Appendix reports the “first-stage” regressions of the endogenous
variables Family Funds and Family Categories. The key findings are that, on average,
families located in counties with a larger employment in the financial sector (relative to the
total number of establishments) offer a larger number of funds or funds in a larger number
of categories.
The validity of these instruments relies on two key assumptions: 1) each fund family
represents a small fraction of Employment Financial Sector in the cross-section of
U.S. counties; and 2) the exclusion restriction that, for example, Employment Financial
Sector in Los Angeles or Boston does not directly affect the demand and the market
share of American Funds or Fidelity, whose headquarters are in Los Angeles and Boston,
respectively.11 Since fund families tend to locate in large financial centers such as New
York, San Francisco and Chicago (Christoffersen and Sarkissian, 2009), while competing
to attract investors nationwide, these assumptions seems reasonable features of the mutual
fund industry. Nonetheless, in Section 5.5, we check the robustness of our results against
potential concerns about the validity of these assumptions and, thus, of the instruments.
In addition, it is important to note that the thrust of our empirical analysis relies on the
comparison between spillovers in the retail and institutional segments of the market. Our
results will differ across these two segments, and reasonable arguments against the validity
of the instruments should account for this difference.
Furthermore, we also instrument Family Fees—the other endogenous variable in the
model—using the instruments introduced by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) to estimate
utility functions with unobservable characteristics: summary measures of other families’
characteristics in the current year. In particular, we use average returns and variance of
returns. These instruments capture the effect of a family’s relative position in characteristics
space, assumed to be exogenous, on their endogenous decisions, independent of the family’s
unobservable characteristics.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 present IV estimates of the coefficients of equation
(7). The positive coefficients of Log(Family Funds) and Log(Family Categories)
indicate that investors are more likely to allocate their assets in families that offer more
funds, consistent with our demand spillovers arguments. However, strictly speaking, the
11The instruments may also affect the market share of the family if, for example, higher wages attract
more-skilled managers, who, in turn, generate higher returns. All our regressions include returns, thus
controlling directly for this effect.
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positive coefficients of Log(Family Funds) and Log(Family Categories) in columns
(1) and (2) do not necessarily imply demand spillovers. For example, if, for whatever reason,
investors allocate their money randomly across funds, then, mechanically, families that offer
more funds would have a higher market share. Nevertheless, the coefficients are estimated
to be statistically larger than one, indicating that families that offer more funds (categories)
have a proportionally larger market share. The magnitude of the effects is also non-trivial:
A family that offers ten-percent more funds has a 14.8-percent higher market share, and a
family that offers ten-percent more categories has a 20.1-percent higher market share.
5.3.2 Fund-level Evidence
To investigate the importance of demand-side spillovers at the fund level, we enrich equation
(7) as follows:
Log (Fund Market Sharejkit) = αLog(Varietyit)+βXjkit+γZit+ζk+ηt+ jkit. (8)
The dependent variable Log(Fund Market Sharejkit) is the log of the market share of
fund j in category k belonging to family i in year t. Varietyit is either Family Funds
or Family Categories offered by family i in year t. Xjkit is a vector of variables specific
to each individual fund, such as the annual return of the fund, the (log of the) age of the
fund, the turnover. Zit is a vector of variables specific to each individual family, such as the
average return of all funds, the variance of returns of all funds, and the (log of the) age of
the family, measured as the age of the oldest active fund. ζk is a category fixed effect, ηt is a
year fixed effect and jkit is an idiosyncratic unobserved component. Hence, equation (8) is
similar to equation (7), but it uses a richer set of characteristics at the individual fund level,
thus more carefully controlling funds’ observable heterogeneity across families.
Table 3 reports IV estimates of the coefficients. In all specifications, the endogenous vari-
ables Family Funds or Family Categories are instrumented with the same supply-side
shifters described in Section 5.3.1. Similarly, we instrument Fund Fees using the average
excess return and average variance of excess returns of rival families, as well as average returns
of other funds operated by rival families in the same category. Specifications (1) and (2) do
not include category fixed effects; specifications (3) and (4) include them; and specifications
(5) and (6) include category-year fixed effects. The coefficients of the two variables capturing
the family variety of funds—Log(Family Funds) and Log(Family Categories)—are
significantly higher than zero in all specifications. The signs of these coefficients indicate
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that, on average, the market share of a retail fund is larger if the number of funds (categories)
offered by its family is larger. This is a strong confirmation of the results of Table 2 and
reinforces the idea that demand spillovers play an important role in the retail segment of
the market. For example, according to the coefficients of specifications (5) and (6), a family
that offers ten-percent more funds than its rivals has a 3.7-percent higher market share for
each fund of the same family, and a family that offers ten-percent more categories than its
rivals has a 5.3-percent higher market share for each fund of the same family. Furthermore,
the coefficients of Family Excess Return is positive in all specifications, although some-
times not significant, confirming the importance of within-family performance spillovers, as
in Nanda, Wang and Zheng (2004) and Ivkovic´ (2004).
Columns (7) and (8) of Table 3 report the estimates of the coefficients of equation (8)
obtained on a sample of S&P 500 index funds only. These regressions are particularly
interesting because the sample is restricted to (almost) homogeneous products that passively
follow an index. Thus, we should expect the effect of demand spillovers on this sample of
S&P 500 index funds to be greater than on the entire sample, for two main reasons. First,
fund heterogeneity (observed and unobserved) should play a limited role on index funds.
Second, an S&P 500 index fund may be a “focal” fund in which investors “park” their assets
when they unload them from other funds within the family. Indeed, the coefficients reported
in columns (7) and (8) exactly indicate that the effect of spillovers is greater on this sample
of S&P 500 index funds: The coefficients of the two variables capturing the family variety
of funds—Log(Family Funds) and Log(Family Categories)—are significantly larger
in columns (7) and (8) than in columns (5) and (6), confirming the importance of demand
spillovers. More precisely, the market share of the S&P 500 index fund offered by a family
that offers ten-percent more funds than its rivals is 7.6-percent higher, and the market share
of the S&P 500 index fund offered by a family that offers ten-percent more categories than
its rivals is 14.6-percent higher.
5.3.3 Category-level Evidence
We now investigate the importance of demand-side spillovers by examining how the number
of family products affects the family’s market share in each Lipper objective code. These
regressions serve two main purposes: 1) Perform a robustness check. Since the fund-level
regressions treat each share class offered by a fund as a separate entity, the results reported
in Table 3 may overestimate the number of independent observations, potentially biasing
some coefficients. 2) Investigate the role of spillovers across different investment objectives,
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rather than across different funds.
With these goals in mind, we estimate the following regression:
Log (Cat-Fam Market Sharekit) = αLog(Varietyit)+βXkit+γZit+ζk+ηt+kit. (9)
The dependent variable is the log of the market share of all funds in category k belonging
to family i in year t. Varietyit is either Family Funds or Family Categories offered
by family i in year t. Xkit is a vector of variables specific to each individual family-category
pair, such as the funds’ average return, the variance of funds’ returns, and the (log of the)
age of the category, measured as the age of the oldest active fund. Zit is a vector of variables
specific to each individual family, such as the average return of all funds, the variance of
returns of all funds, and the (log of the) age of the family, measured as the age of the oldest
active fund. ζk is a category fixed effect, ηt is a year fixed effect and kit is an idiosyncratic
unobserved component.
Table 4 reports IV estimates of the coefficients. Columns (1) to (6) reports the results
for all retail category-family pairs. Specifications (1) and (2) do not include category fixed
effects; specifications (3) and (4) include them; and specifications (5) and (6) include fixed
effects for each category-year pair. The endogenous variables—i.e., Family Funds or Fam-
ily Categories, and Family-Category Fees—are instrumented with the supply-side
shifters used in the fund-level regressions reported in the previous Section. The coeffi-
cients of the two variables capturing the family variety of funds—Log(Family Funds) and
Log(Family Categories)—are significantly higher than zero in all specifications. The
signs of these coefficients indicate that, on average, the market share of a category of funds
is larger if the number of funds (categories) offered by its family is larger. This confirms
the results of Tables 2 and 3 that demand spillovers play an important role in the retail
segment of the market, and indicates that those results were not an artifact of measurement
error. In particular, the coefficients of specifications (5) and (6) imply that a family that
offers ten-percent more funds than its rivals has a 6.3-percent higher market share for each
category of funds of the same family, and a family that offers ten-percent more categories
than its rivals has a nine-percent higher market share for each category of funds of the same
family.
Columns (7) and (8) of Table 4 report the estimates of the coefficients of equation (9)
obtained on the category of S&P 500 index funds only. In these specifications, we use
our supply shifters only to instrument the endogenous variables Family Funds or Family
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Categories, since instrumenting Family Fees generates unstable results. With this caveat
in mind, the coefficients reported in columns (7) and (8) confirm that the effect of spillovers is
greater on this sample of S&P 500 index funds: The coefficients of the two variables capturing
the family variety of funds—Log(Family Funds) and Log(Family Categories)—are
larger in columns (7) and (8) than in columns (5) and (6), confirming the importance of
demand spillovers. More precisely, the market share of the S&P 500 index category of funds
offered by a family that offers ten-percent more funds than its rivals is 11-percent higher,
and the market share of the S&P 500 index category of funds offered by a family that offers
ten-percent more categories than its rivals is 22-percent higher.
5.4 Demand Spillovers in the Institutional Segment
We now measure the magnitude of demand spillovers in the institutional segment of the
market and compare it with the magnitudes estimated previously in the retail segment. This
comparison is useful to understanding the differential patterns between the institutional and
retail segments highlighted in Figure 3. In particular, Proposition 1 and Corollary 2 of our
simple model suggest that these differential patterns are the natural equilibrium outcomes
if demand spillovers differ in the two segments of the market.
We investigate the magnitude of demand spillovers in the institutional segment by esti-
mating the same equations (7), (8) and (9) on the sample of institutional funds, instrument-
ing the endogenous variables—i.e., Family Funds or Family Categories and Family
Fees—with the same supply-side shifters described in Section 5.3.1: total employment in
the financial sector; the total number of establishments; the distance of the headquarters
from New York City; and the average excess return and average variance of excess returns
of rival families.
Table 5 reports the estimates of the coefficients of equation (7)—i.e., the family-level
regressions—on the sample of families of institutional funds. The dependent variable in
specifications (1) and (2) is (the log of) the aggregate market share of the family—i.e.,
Log(Family Market Shareit). The table shows that we cannot statistically reject the
hypothesis that the coefficients of the two variables capturing the variety of families’ funds—
Log(Family Funds) and Log(Family Categories)—are lower than one in specifications
(1) and (2). Thus, there is no evidence that families that offer more funds (categories) have
a proportionally larger market share. This suggests that demand spillovers do not play an
important role in the institutional segment, in sharp contrast to the evidence from the retail
segment reported in Table 2.
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Table 6 reports the estimates of the coefficients of equation (8)—i.e., the fund-level
regressions—on the sample of institutional funds. The dependent variable in the specifica-
tions (1) to (8) is the log of each fund’s market share—i.e., Log(Fund Market Sharejkit).
The coefficients of the two variables capturing the family variety of funds—Log(Family
Funds) and Log(Family Categories)—are negative and/or not significantly different
from zero. Thus, these coefficients confirm the results of Table 5: On average, the market
share of (and the assets managed by) an institutional fund is not higher when the number
of institutional funds (categories) offered by its family is higher. This corroborates that de-
mand spillovers do not play an important role in the institutional segment, in sharp contrast
to the evidence from the retail segment reported in Table 3. Moreover, it is interesting to
note that the coefficients of all other family-level variables—i.e., Family Excess Return,
Family Variance Excess Return, and Family Turnover—are insignificant in almost
all specifications, reinforcing the idea of weaker within-family spillovers in the institutional
segment than in the retail segment of the market.
Table 7 reports the estimates of the coefficients of equation (9)—i.e., the category-level
regressions—on the sample of institutional funds. The dependent variable in the specifi-
cations (1) to (8) is (the log of) each family category’s market share—i.e., Log(Cat-Fam
Market Sharejkit). The coefficients of the two variables capturing the family variety of
funds—Log(Family Funds) and Log(Family Categories)—are again negative and/or
not significantly different from zero. Thus, these coefficients confirm that the family market
share in a category of funds is not higher when the number of institutional funds (cate-
gories) offered by the family is higher. The difference in the signs of the coefficients and/or
in their statistical (in)significance across specifications indicates that demand spillovers do
not play an important role in the institutional segment, in contrast to the evidence from
the retail segment reported in Table 4. Furthermore, the coefficients of all other family-level
variables—i.e., Family Excess Return, Family Variance Excess Return, and Fam-
ily Turnover—are insignificant in most specifications, providing further evidence that
within-family spillovers in the institutional segment are not as relevant as in the retail seg-
ment of the market.
5.5 Robustness Checks and Alternative Hypotheses
We now present robustness checks using an alternative set of instruments and discuss in
detail two leading alternative hypotheses, presenting arguments against them.
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Alternative Instruments. We now verify the robustness of the results to several poten-
tial concerns about the validity of the instruments. As highlighted in Section 5.3.1, the
validity of the instruments relies on two main assumptions: 1) each fund family represents a
small fraction of Employment Financial Sector in the cross-section of U.S. counties;
and 2) the exclusion restriction that, for example, Employment Financial Sector in
Los Angeles or Boston does not directly affect the demand and market share of American
Funds or Fidelity, whose headquarters are in Los Angeles and Boston, respectively. While, in
principle, we could subtract each family’s employees from Employment Financial Sec-
tor to directly avoid any reverse causality concern, CRSP does not, unfortunately, report
this information, and we are not aware of another public dataset that does. Moreover, this
alternative procedure would not directly address concerns about the plausibility of our ex-
clusion restriction. Furthermore, another potential concern about our instruments is that
families’ location is endogenous. For example, Employment Financial Sector could
affect the number of family funds—as this paper posits—and other unobserved dimensions
of a family’s “quality” of offerings, such as financial advice. If this is the case, the estimates
of demand spillovers may be biased.
To address all these concerns, in the spirit of the empirical literature on differentiated
products following Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), we use supply-side variables of other
families as instruments for each family’s endogenous measure of varieties. Specifically, for
each family i, we compute the average Employment Financial Sector, Total Estab-
lishments and Distance from NYC of all families whose headquarters are located in
a different county than family i, and we use those as instruments for Family Funds and
Family Categories of family i. In oligopoly markets, these are valid instruments since
rival families’ cost shifters affect equilibrium best-responses and, thus, families’ equilibrium
characteristics, such as product varieties. In addition, by construction, these instruments
do not suffer from reverse causality and do not directly affect families’ demands and mar-
ket shares. Moreover, as the empirical literature on differentiated products since Berry,
Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) advocates, they are arguably uncorrelated with each family’s
unobservable characteristics.
Table 8 reports the second stage of the family-level regressions using these alternative
instruments. Columns (1) and (2) refer to retail funds, columns (3) and (4) to institutional
funds. The Table shows that the estimates of the coefficients are almost identical to those
reported in Tables 2 and 5, respectively, indicating that our results are robust to potential
concerns about the validity of the instruments.
We have also performed the fund-level and category-level regressions using this alternative
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set of instruments. The results (omitted) confirm that, on average, the market share of a
fund or of a family’s category of funds is larger if the number of funds (categories) offered
by its family is larger in the retail segment, but not in the institutional segment. These
additional checks further corroborate the robustness of our results on the importance of
demand spillovers in the retail segment, but not in the institutional segment.
Economies of Scale and Scope. Khorana and Servaes (1999) suggest that economies of
scale and scope are important in the mutual fund industry. These economies may induce
larger families to launch more new funds, and they may also constitute a barrier to entry for
new families, thus potentially explaining some of the empirical patterns documented. Sim-
ilarly, in an influential paper, Schmalensee (1978) argues that incumbent firms may choose
to offer multiple products in order to “fill the product space,” thus crowding out additional
entrants. (Bonanno, 1987, analyzes Schmalensee’s argument, showing that incumbents deter
entry through product specification, rather than through product proliferation.)
While economies of scale and scope are key features that shape competitive outcomes in
the mutual fund industry, we reiterate that our empirical model identifies investors’ demand,
since the instruments used in our empirical model exploit exogenous supply-side shifters of
the number of funds and number of categories offered by each family. In addition, our analysis
reveals striking differences between the retail and institutional segments of the market. All
supply-side factors—including economies of scale and scope—should not differ between retail
and institutional funds. Moreover, our results stand when we restrict our analysis to (almost)
homogenous products such as S&P 500 index funds. Furthermore, several families offer funds
in both the retail and the institutional segments of the market, presumably sharing any costs
savings due to lower research, product development, and administrative costs. Thus, it is not
clear why the two segments of the market exhibit such stark differences. But our argument
rests on demand spillovers, and we highlighted in Section 3 why these spillovers differ between
the retail and institutional segments.
Advertising and Research Expenditures. Sutton’s (1991 and 1998) seminal work fo-
cuses on two main types of endogenous sunk costs: advertising and research outlays. Thus,
a natural question is whether these costs can account for the empirical patterns documented.
In particular, Park (2008) documents that advertising expenditure has increased over time
in the mutual fund industry (in particular, for no-load funds), and this increase may have
fostered concentration. However, it is unlikely that this alternative hypothesis can explain
all our empirical findings, for several reasons. First, we wish to emphasize that our empirical
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model is designed to precisely control for spurious correlations due to unobserved factors, in-
cluding advertising and research expenditures. In particular, the instruments that we employ
in the empirical analysis exploit exogenous variations in the number of funds and number
of categories offered. Second, many families offer funds in both the retail and the institu-
tional segments of the market, and, presumably, the effects of advertising and research (in
particular) are not confined to a single segment of the market. Thus, it is not immediately
obvious why market conduct and market structure respond differently to the same input.
Third, and perhaps most important, Gallaher, Kaniel and Starks (2009) investigate patterns
of advertising in the mutual fund industry and find that families with funds in more objec-
tive classes advertise less than families with fewer objectives. Hence, if advertising were the
key determinant of market structure and concentration in the retail segment, their finding
would imply that families with funds in more objective classes should have a larger market
share, in sharp contrast to the results of our analysis of Section 5.3.1. Thus, we conclude
that advertising and research expenditures cannot explain our empirical findings.
6 Conclusions
This paper investigates, both theoretically and empirically, the role of demand for firms’
product varieties and demand spillovers in determining market conduct and market structure
in the mutual fund industry. The model adapts Sutton’s (1991) endogenous sunk costs
theory, highlighting that the magnitude of spillovers determines the industry equilibrium. If
demand for firms’ product portfolios and, thus, demand spillovers are strong, competition
induces families to offer a large number of funds rather than low fees. As a result, the
industry remains concentrated even in large markets. Instead, if demand for firms’ product
portfolios and spillovers are weak, the number of funds that each family offers is limited, fees
are lower, and the industry is more fragmented in larger markets.
Aggregate empirical patterns reveal striking differences between the retail and institu-
tional segments of the market: in the retail segment, families offer more funds; funds have
higher fees; the market is more concentrated and the total number of funds is larger than in
the institutional segment. These patterns are exactly the outcomes predicted by the theo-
retical model if spillovers are stronger in the retail than in the institutional segment. Indeed,
the empirical analysis provides strong evidence that these spillovers are stronger in the retail
segment of the market.
The ideas of this paper are potentially useful in understanding several market outcomes
in all industries in which consumers prefer to purchase from a single supplier (banking,
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commercial aircraft, supermarkets, etc.). For example, an interesting question, left for future
research, is what are the determinants and the effects of mergers in such markets.
A First-stage Regressions
Table A1 reports the results of the first-stage regressions of the endogenous variables Family
Funds—i.e., the total number of funds offered by a family—or Family Categories—i.e.,
the total number of categories/investment objectives in which a family offers at least one
fund—offered by family i in year t in the respective segment (retail or institutional) on the
following instruments: Employment Financial Sector, the total employment in the
financial sector in the same county in which the family has its headquarters; Total Es-
tablishments, the number of establishments in the same county in which the family has
its headquarters; Distance from NYC, the distance of the family headquarters’ address
from New York City; Average Excess Return Other Families, the average Family
Excess Return of all other families; and Average Variance Excess Return Other
Families, the average Family Variance Excess Return of all other families. Specifi-
cations (1) and (3) refer to retail funds, and specifications (2) and (4) refer to institutional
funds.
The signs of the coefficients of the instruments are largely as expected. In particular, on
average, a larger employment in the financial sector, relative to the total employment, in
the same county in which the family has its headquarters corresponds to a larger number of
funds or to a larger number of categories offered by the family. This is true in both the retail
and institutional segments. Moreover, the instruments are jointly significant: the F -tests
are equal to 24.06, 14.07, 23.91, and 13.22, respectively, in specifications (1)-(4).
To appreciate the magnitude implied by the coefficients, we construct the fitted number
of funds from the coefficients of column (1). These fitted values imply, for example, that
the average number of funds offered by a family whose headquarters are in New York, NY
is twice as large as a family’s whose headquarters are in Austin, TX: 33 funds versus 16.6
funds.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Retail Funds Institutional Funds
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev
Fund Market Share .0106 .0558 .0207 .0993
Fund Fees .0192 .0080 .0099 .0046
Fund Age 9.043 8.695 6.868 4.936
Fund Return 1.076 .1782 1.0869 .1674
Fund Turnover 1.044 2.022 .9587 1.129
Family Funds 120.0 93.71 60.57 58.84
Family Categories 26.8 15.90 18.54 9.90
Family Excess Return −.0050 .0670 −.0003 .0437
Family Variance Excess Return .0117 .0706 .0059 .0233
Family Turnover .8463 .8601 .8540 .6097
Employment Financial Sector 122, 397 117, 365 121, 274 113, 971
Total Establishments 53, 661 48, 473 59, 889 59, 373
Wage ($1,000) 54.8 18.0 53.8 18.6
Wage Financial Sector ($1,000) 109.4 60.9 108.5 63.4
Distance from New York 11.4 15.1 13.3 16.8
# Obs 66, 271 22, 524
Notes: This table provides summary statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis. Most fund
variables follow the exact definition of the CRSP Mutual Fund Database. CRSP classifies each fund as retail
or institutional fund, and we follow this definition. Fund Market Share is the market share of a fund
in a given year, equal to
100∗Fund Tnajt∑
j
Fund Tnajt
where Fund Tna is the fund’s total net assets. Fund Fees are
equal to regular expenses, plus one seventh of front- and rear-end fees charged by the family. Fund Age
is the number of years since the fund was established. Fund Return is the annual return of the fund.
Fund Turnover is the fund turnover ratio, expressed as a percentage of the fund. Family Funds is the
number of funds offered by the fund family. Family Categories is the number of Lipper categories in
which the fund family offers at least one fund. Family Excess Return is the asset-weighted, objective-
adjusted average family abnormal return. Family Variance of Excess Return is the asset-weighted,
objective-adjusted variance of family abnormal returns. Family Turnover is the asset-weighted average
turnover across all the family’s funds. Total Establishments is the number of establishments in the
county corresponding to the zip code of the family address reported in CRSP. Employment Financial
Sector is the total employment in the financial sector in the county corresponding to the zip code of
the family address reported in CRSP. Wage is total payroll divided by total employment in the county
corresponding to the zip code of the family address reported in CRSP. Wage Financial Sector is total
payroll in the financial sector divided by Employment Financial Sector in the county corresponding to
the zip code of the family address reported in CRSP. These last four variables are obtained from the County
Business Patterns. Distance from New York is the distance of the family address from New York City.
All data refer to the years from 1999 to 2007.
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Table 2: Demand Spillovers: Family Regressions, Retail Segment
(1) (2)
Log (Family Funds)
1.4816
(.2003)
Log (Family Categories)
2.0126
(.2962)
Log(Family Fees)
−2.9583
(.5871)
−2.6735
(.6467)
Family Age
.0330
(.0092)
.0248
(.0089)
Family Excess Return
.9222
(.3150)
.9911
(.3397)
Family Variance Excess Return
.2458
(.3139)
.2581
(.3244)
Family Turnover
.0143
(.0394)
.0128
(.0412)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
# Obs 3, 753 3, 753
# Families 528 528
Notes: This table reports the results of Instrumental Variable regressions that investigate whether a family
that offers more funds or categories than its rivals in the retail segment has a proportionally larger market
share in the retail segment. Each observation corresponds to a family-year pair. The dependent variable
is Log(Family Market Share), the log of a family’s aggregate market share. All independent variables
are defined in Section 5.1. The endogenous variables Family Funds, Family Categories, and Family
Fees are instrumented using the instruments described in the text. All regressions further include year fixed
effects. The data refer to the years from 1999 to 2007. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
fund family level.
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Table 3: Demand Spillovers: Fund Regressions, Retail Segment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log (Family Funds)
.2479
(.0936)
.4087
(.1060)
.3757
(.1077)
.7692
(.4042)
Log (Family Categories)
.3170
(.1365)
.6008
(.1608)
.5345
(.1622)
1.4686
(.7969)
Log(Fund Fees)
−1.8956
(.2639)
−1.8237
(.2628)
−4.0068
(.6715)
−3.8006
(.6625)
−2.2786
(.8219)
−2.0771
(.7934)
−1.2280
(.3137)
−1.2394
(.3103)
Fund Return
1.3359
(.1043)
1.3239
(.1040)
.6554
(.0636)
.6524
(.0635)
1.0942
(.1441)
1.1086
(.1413)
Fund Turnover
−.0480
(.0118)
−.0428
(.0105)
−.0518
(.0118)
−.0459
(.0121)
−.0630
(.0112)
−.0555
(.0117)
Fund Age
.0830
(.0050)
.0823
(.0051)
.0724
(.0065)
.0711
(.0067)
.0866
(.0077)
.0861
(.0078)
.1753
(.0325)
.1504
(.0364)
Family Excess Return
1.2196
(.3058)
1.2279
(.3053)
.3956
(.4213)
.4354
(.4203)
1.1267
(.4698)
1.1651
(.4637)
2.2998
(1.9101)
2.5717
(2.1219)
Family Variance Excess Return
−.2237
(.2664)
−.2350
(.2448)
.2569
(.2433)
.2531
(.2403)
−.1697
(.2717)
−.1909
(.2705)
−3.0000
(3.9430)
−1.3135
(4.9756)
Family Turnover
.0453
(.0536)
.0475
(.0550)
.0428
(.0610)
.0587
(.0632)
.0096
(.0605)
.0218
(.0630)
−.9059
(.4624)
−.8483
(.4671)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A Yes Yes
Category Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes N/A N/A N/A N/A
Category-Year Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes N/A N/A
# Obs 66, 271 66, 271 66, 271 66, 271 66, 271 66, 271 497 497
# Funds 10, 768 10, 768 10, 768 10, 768 10, 768 10, 768 78 78
Notes: This table reports the results of Instrumental Variable regressions that investigate whether a retail fund whose family offers more funds
or categories than its rivals in the retail segment has a larger market share. Specifications (1)-(6) employ the sample of all retail mutual funds.
Specifications (7) and (8) employ the sample of all retail S&P500 index funds. Each observation corresponds to a fund-year pair. The dependent
variable is Log(Fund Market Share), the log of a fund’s market share, in all specifications. The independent variables are defined in Section 5.1.
The endogenous variables Family Funds, Family Categories, and Fund Fees are instrumented using the instruments described in the text. All
specifications also include year fixed effects; specifications (3) and (4) further include Lipper categories fixed effects; specifications (5) and (6) include
fixed effects for each Lipper category-year pair. The data refer to the years from 1999 to 2007. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the fund
family level.
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Table 4: Demand Spillovers: Category Regressions, Retail Segment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log (Family Funds)
.4340
(.0862)
.6418
(.1437)
.6328
(.1381)
1.1477
(.5670)
Log (Family Categories)
.6353
(.1338)
.9491
(.2180)
.9063
(.2117)
2.2886
(1.0852)
Log(Category-Family Fees)
−1.0530
(.3288)
−.9280
(.3331)
−1.5045
(.6750)
−1.3351
(.6975)
−1.6820
(.6399)
−1.3202
(.6615)
−.8889
(.2816)
−.9100
(.2485)
Category-Family Return
1.5624
(.1071)
1.5415
(.1086)
.9452
(.0759)
.9629
(.0770)
1.4146
(.0759)
1.4099
(.1615)
Category-Family Turnover
−.0324
(.0105)
−.0261
(.0106)
−.0421
(.0114)
−.0331
(.0116)
−.0404
(.0113)
−.0306
(.0115)
Category-Family Age
.0604
(.0048)
.0601
(.0048)
.0538
(.0068)
.0531
(.0067)
.0555
(.0064)
.0553
(.0064)
.1189
(.0595)
.0608
(.0741)
Family Excess Return
.6460
(.2944)
.6920
(.2985)
1.0464
(.3044)
1.0603
(.3089)
.4889
(.3462)
.6087
(.3489)
6.0218
(2.3719)
6.6240
(2.6481)
Family Variance Excess Return
−.5217
(.2319)
−.4854
(.2470)
−.3207
(.3092)
−.2441
(.3320)
−.3704
(.2943)
−.3765
(.3198)
−12.1359
(5.1826)
−9.9457
(5.8704)
Family Turnover
.0191
(.0408)
.0317
(.0425)
−.0067
(.0480)
.0126
(.0511)
−.0073
(.0456)
.0003
(.0487)
−1.3496
(.8537)
−1.4084
(.9225)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A Yes Yes
Category Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes N/A N/A N/A N/A
Category-Year Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes N/A N/A
# Obs 23, 888 23, 888 23, 888 23, 888 23, 888 23, 888 285 285
# Category-Family Pairs 3, 493 3, 493 3, 493 3, 493 3, 493 3, 493 39 39
Notes: This table reports the results of Instrumental Variable regressions that investigate whether a category of retail funds offered by a family that
offers more funds or categories than its rivals in the retail segment has a larger market share. Specifications (1)-(6) employ the sample of all retail
category-family pairs. Specifications (7) and (8) employ the category of retail S&P500 index funds. Each observation corresponds to a category-
family-year tuple. The dependent variable is Log(Cat-Fam Market Share), the log of a family-category’s market share, in all specifications. The
independent variables are defined in Section 5.1. The endogenous variables Family Funds, Family Categories, and Category-Family Fees are
instrumented using the instruments described in the text. All specifications also include year fixed effects; specifications (3) and (4) further include
Lipper categories fixed effects; specifications (5) and (6) include fixed effects for each Lipper category-year pair. The data refer to the years from 1999
to 2007. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the fund family level.
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Table 5: Demand Spillovers: Family Regressions, Institutional Segment
(1) (2)
Log (Family Funds)
1.1540
(.4407)
Log (Family Categories)
1.3750
(.5783)
Log(Family Fees)
−4.1425
(1.5450)
−4.4301
(1.5682)
Family Age
.0187
(.0259)
.0071
(.0243)
Family Excess Return
1.5126
(.5478)
1.4366
(.5570)
Family Variance Excess Return
1.0796
(1.4942)
1.2517
(1.5843)
Family Turnover
−.0355
(.1463)
−.0148
(.1483)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
# Obs 1, 574 1, 574
# Families 231 231
Notes: This table reports the results of Instrumental Variable regressions that investigate whether families
that offer more institutional funds or categories have a proportionally larger aggregate market share in
the institutional segment. Each observation corresponds to a family-year pair. The dependent variable is
Log(Family Market Share), the log of a family’s aggregate market share. All independent variables are
defined in Section 5.1. The endogenous variables Family Funds, Family Categories, and Family Fees
are instrumented using the instruments described in the text. All regressions further include year fixed
effects. The data refer to the years from 1999 to 2007. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
fund family level.
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Table 6: Demand Spillovers: Fund Regressions, Institutional Segment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log (Family Funds)
−.2580
(.2069)
−.4259
(.2670)
−.6434
(.3018)
.5880
(.4456)
Log (Family Categories)
−.2560
(.3331)
−.6014
(.5363)
−.6984
(.5227)
.6319
(.4060)
Log(Fund Fees)
−.8573
(.3810)
−.7669
(.4028)
−4.6212
(1.8641)
−4.5437
(2.1978)
−4.7364
(1.7431)
−4.0997
(1.9553)
−1.9303
(.6410)
−1.7120
(.3819)
Fund Return
.6165
(.2492)
.5201
(.2587)
.3964
(.1166)
.3883
(.1216)
.0354
(.2660)
.1711
(.2380)
Fund Turnover
−.0603
(.0456)
−.0683
(.0445)
.0899
(.0888)
.0850
(.1064)
.0913
(.0847)
.0660
(.0976)
Fund Age
.1576
(.0224)
.1593
(.0220)
.1441
(.0326)
.1561
(.0320)
.1310
(.0325)
.1530
(.0310)
.1943
(.0474)
.1800
(.0450)
Family Excess Return
.7631
(.5670)
.9190
(.5671)
−.9832
(.9095)
−1.0248
(1.1689)
−1.1178
(.9458)
−.9921
(1.1599)
−1.9303
(.6410)
−3.0160
(2.1930)
Family Variance Excess Return
−.4352
(1.7760)
−.5835
(1.6737)
3.2676
(2.1138)
3.4026
(2.3287)
2.9026
(2.0922)
2.7966
(2.2593)
20.3174
(14.4468)
8.8663
(11.4196)
Family Turnover
.0467
(.1520)
.0375
(.1541)
.1986
(.2414)
.1847
(.2609)
.2191
(.2305)
.1953
(.2475)
−.8458
(.3486)
−.9633
(.2445)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A Yes Yes
Category Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes N/A N/A N/A N/A
Category-Year Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes N/A N/A
# Obs 22, 524 22, 524 22, 524 22, 524 22, 524 22, 524 424 424
# Funds 4, 366 4, 366 4, 366 4, 366 4, 366 4, 366 67 67
Notes: This table reports the results of Instrumental Variable regressions that investigate whether an institutional fund whose family offers more funds
or categories than its rivals in the institutional segment has a larger market share. Specifications (1)-(6) employ the sample of all institutional mutual
funds. Specifications (7) and (8) employ the sample of all retail S&P500 index funds. Each observation corresponds to a fund-year pair. The dependent
variable is Log(Fund Market Share), the log of each fund’s market share, in all specifications. The independent variables are defined in Section 5.1.
The endogenous variables Family Funds, Family Categories, and Fund Fees are instrumented using the instruments described in the text. All
specifications also include year fixed effects; specifications (3) and (4) further include Lipper categories fixed effects; specifications (5) and (6) include
fixed effects for each Lipper category-year pair. The data refer to the years from 1999 to 2007. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the fund
family level.
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Table 7: Demand Spillovers: Category Regressions, Institutional Segment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log (Family Funds)
−.0177
(.2551)
−.3148
(.4459)
−.5099
(.4268)
.6529
(.5881)
Log (Family Categories)
−.2752
(.3215)
−.3402
(.4610)
−.5285
(.4549)
.4375
(.9822)
Log(Category-Family Fees)
−1.4793
(.4454)
−1.5673
(.4477)
−4.5194
(1.7139)
−4.2032
(1.3311)
−6.2816
(1.8303)
−5.6920
(1.4888)
−1.5826
(.7525)
−1.6001
(1.0976)
Category-Family Return
1.3569
(.2309)
1.3761
(.2332)
.6256
(.1323)
.6351
(.1219)
1.0448
(.2388)
1.0656
(.2372)
Category-Family Turnover
−.0527
(.0373)
−.0464
(.0361)
.0441
(.0642)
.0304
(.0510)
.0890
(.0665)
.0654
(.0542)
Category-Family Age
.1238
(.0211)
.1238
(.0213)
.0898
(.0272)
.0922
(.0266)
.0933
(.0276)
.0959
(.0271)
.1191
(.0904)
.1129
(.1413)
Family Excess Return
−.5278
(.5941)
−.6100
(.5952)
−.8515
(.6864)
−.8302
(.6540)
−1.8038
(.8612)
−1.7185
(.8214)
.1494
(1.8640)
1.3338
(1.7066)
Family Variance Excess Return
−.9032
(1.3842)
−1.0242
(1.3162)
1.5460
(1.6390)
1.4454
(1.5791)
2.7747
(1.7132)
2.5603
(1.6431)
−.1875
(9.9345)
−.6705
(9.7873)
Family Turnover
−.0097
(.1511)
.0134
(.1461)
.0095
(.1991)
.0025
(.1872)
.1081
(.2048)
.0866
(.1928)
−1.0749
(.5240)
−.8771
(.5302)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A Yes Yes
Category Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes N/A N/A N/A N/A
Category-Year Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes N/A N/A
# Obs 12, 061 12, 061 12, 061 12, 061 12, 061 12, 061 263 263
# Category-Family Pairs 1, 971 1, 971 1, 971 1, 971 1, 971 1, 971 38 38
Notes: This table reports the results of Instrumental Variable regressions that investigate whether a category of institutional funds offered by a
family that offers more funds or categories than its rivals in the institutional segment has a larger market share. Specifications (1)-(6) employ the
sample of all institutional category-family pairs. Specifications (7) and (8) employ the category of institutional S&P500 index funds. Each observation
corresponds to a category-family-year triple. The dependent variable is Log(Cat-Fam Market Share), the log of a family-category’s market share,
in all specifications. The independent variables are defined in Section 5.1. The endogenous variables Family Funds, Family Categories, and
Category-Family Fees are instrumented using the instruments described in the text. All specifications also include year fixed effects; specifications
(3) and (4) further include Lipper categories fixed effects; specifications (5) and (6) include fixed effects for each Lipper category-year pair. The data
refer to the years from 1999 to 2007. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the fund family level.
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Table 8: Alternative Instruments: Family Regressions
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Log (Family Funds)
1.5098
(.1939)
1.2186
(.5326)
Log (Family Categories)
2.0809
(.2889)
1.0190
(.6178)
Log(Family Fees)
−2.982
(.5895)
−2.6904
(.6672)
−3.4199
(1.3596)
−3.5357
(1.3459)
Family Age
.0337
(.0093)
.0258
(.0091)
.0298
(.0256)
.0125
(.0224)
Family Excess Return
.9060
(.3126)
.9725
(.3402)
1.5424
(.5509)
1.4645
(.5387)
Family Variance Excess Return
.2614
(.3068)
.2772
(.3178)
.5687
(1.3881)
.2540
(1.4170)
Family Turnover
.0186
(.0405)
.0196
(.0430)
−.0652
(.1330)
−.0476
(.1368)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Obs 3, 753 3, 753 1, 574 1, 574
# Families 528 528 231 231
Notes: This table reports the results of Instrumental Variable regressions that investigate whether families
that offer more funds or categories have a proportionally larger aggregate market share. Specifications (1) and
(2) refer to the retail segment; specifications (3) and (4) refer to the institutional segment. Each observation
corresponds to a family-year pair. The dependent variable is Log(Family Market Share), the log of each
family’s aggregate market share in a given segment. The independent variables are defined in Section 5.1.
The endogenous variables Family Funds, Family Categories, and Family Fees are instrumented using
the instruments described in the text. All regressions further include year fixed effects. The data refer to
the years from 1999 to 2007. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the fund family level.
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Table A1: The Relationship Between Family Product Variety and the Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log (Family Funds) Log (Family Categories)
Family Age
−.0301
(.0017)
−.0336
(.0042)
−.0182
(.0013)
−.0224
(.0031)
Family Excess Return
−10.5670
(2.3411)
−6.6371
(5.5696)
−6.7710
(1.8144)
−7.9637
(4.5459)
Family Variance Excess Return
−9.6742
(5.1218)
−71.726
(20.0828)
−8.3555
(3.8464)
−57.9082
(16.3562)
Family Turnover
−.0148
(.0145)
.0223
(.0394)
−.0182
(.0013)
.0143
(.0318)
Log(Employment Financial Sector/100000)
1.0205
(.1118)
.9400
(.1499)
.7604
(.0814)
.7216
(.1181)
Log(Total Number of Establishments/100000)
−1.2996
(.1659)
−1.0196
(.2308)
−1.0166
(.1220)
−.8258
(.1772)
Average Excess Return Other Families
−4521.2
(982.2)
−1273.3
(984.8)
−2920.5
(763.9)
−1496.7
(806.0)
Average Variance Excess Return Other Families
−3604.8
(2084.3)
−11751.7
(3408.7)
−3131.1
(1559.3)
−9477.9
(2778.2)
Distance from NYC
.0026
(.0016)
.0037
(.0021)
.0025
(.0012)
.0028
(.0017)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Segment Retail Institutional Retail Institutional
# Obs 3, 753 1, 574 3, 753 1, 574
# Families 528 231 528 231
Notes: This table reports the results of the first-stage regressions. The dependent variable is the log of number of retail funds offered by a family in
specification (1); the log of number of institutional funds offered by a family in specification (2); the log of number of Lipper categories in which the
fund family offers at least one retail fund in specification (3); and the log of number of Lipper categories in which the fund family offers at least one
institutional fund in specification (4). The independent variables are defined in the text. All regressions further include year fixed effects. The data
refer to the years from 1999 to 2007. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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